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In order to identify the extent to which results from topological graph models are
useful for modeling vulnerability in electricity infrastructure, we measure the sus-
ceptibility of power networks to random failures and directed attacks using three
measures of vulnerability: characteristic path lengths, connectivity loss and blackout
sizes. The first two are purely topological metrics. The blackout size calculation
results from a model of cascading failure in power networks. Testing the response of
40 areas within the Eastern US power grid and a standard IEEE test case to a variety
of attack/failure vectors indicates that directed attacks result in larger failures using
all three vulnerability measures, but the attack vectors that appear to cause the most
damage depend on the measure chosen. While our topological and power grid model
results show some trends that are similar, there is only a mild correlation between
the vulnerability measures for individual simulations. We conclude that evaluating
vulnerability in power networks using purely topological metrics can be misleading.
Electricity infrastructures are vital to
the operation of modern society, yet
they are notably vulnerable to cascad-
ing failures. Understanding the na-
ture of this vulnerability is fundamen-
tal to the assessment of electric energy
reliability and security. A number of
articles have recently used topological
a)Electronic mail: paul.hines@uvm.edu
b)Electronic mail: eduardo.cotilla-sanchez@uvm.edu
c)Electronic mail: blumsack@psu.edu
(graph theoretic) models to assess vul-
nerability in electricity systems. In this
article we illustrate that under some
circumstances these topological models
can lead to provocative, but ultimately
misleading conclusions. We argue that
emperical comparisons between topo-
logical models and higher fidelity mod-
els are neccessary in order to draw firm
conclusions about the utility of com-
plex networks methods.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Motivated by the importance of reli-
able electricity infrastructure, numerous re-
cent papers have applied complex networks
methods1,2 to study the structure and func-
tion of power grids. Results from these stud-
ies differ greatly. Some measure the topol-
ogy of power grids and report exponential
degree distributions3–5, whereas others re-
port power-law distributions6,7. Some mod-
els of the North American power grid sug-
gest that power grids are more vulnerable to
directed attacks than to random failures4,8,
even though power grids differ from from
scale-free networks in topology. Recently,
Wang and Rong9 used a topological model of
cascading failure and argue that attacks on
nodes (buses) transporting smaller amounts
of power can result in disproportionately
large failures. Albert et al.4 draw the oppo-
site conclusion using similar data. Because of
the potential implications of these results for
infrastructure security, these papers4,9 have
attracted the attention of government and
media10.
The value of purely topological models of
power grid failure in assessing actual fail-
ure modes in the electricity infrastructure
is not well-established. Commodity (elec-
tric energy) flows in electricity networks
are governed by Ohm’s law and Kirchhoff’s
laws, which are not captured particularly
well in simple topological models (see Fig.1).
Some have identified relationships between
the physical properties of power grids and
topological metrics5,11,12, and find that some
metrics do correlate to measures of power sys-
tem performace. However, to our knowledge,
no existing research has systematically com-
pared the results from a power-flow based
cascading failure vulnerability model with
those from graph theoretic models of vul-
nerability. Because cascading failures (and
hurricanes) cause the largest blackouts13 and
contribute disproportionately to overall re-
liability risk14, models that incorporate the
possibility of cascading failure are necessary
to provide a sufficiently broad view of power
network vulnerability. While there is exten-
sive literature on cascading failure and con-
tagion in abstract networks (see, e.g., Sec. 4
of2), and some application of these methods
to power networks15, direct comparisons are
needed to draw firm conclusions about the
utility of topological methods.
Our primary goal, therefore, is is to com-
pare the vulnerability conclusions that result
from topological measures of network vulner-
ability with those that result from a more re-
alistic model of power network failure. We
draw on existing literature (particularly4,16)
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Figure 1. An illustration of the difference be-
tween a topological (nearest-neighbor) model of
cascading failure and one based on Kirchhoff’s
laws. a. Node 2 fails, which means that its power
flow (load) must be redistributed to functioning
nodes. b. In many topological models of cascad-
ing failure (e.g.,9), load from failed components is
redistributed to nearest neighbors (Nodes 1 and
3). c. In an electrical network current re-routes
by Kirchhoff’s laws, which in this case means
that the power that previously traveled through
Node 2 is re-routed through Nodes 5 and 6. In
addition, by Kirchhoff’s laws, Node 3 ends up
with no power-flow.
to choose the topological vulnerability mea-
sures used in this paper.
II. VULNERABILITY MEASURES
Our first vulnerability measure is charac-
teristic path length (0 < L < ∞), which is
the average distance among node pairs in a
graph. In16, path length (network diameter)
was suggested as a measure of network vul-
nerability because as more components fail
nodes become more distant, which may indi-
cate that flows within the network are inhib-
ited.
The second measure is connectivity loss
(0 < C < 1), which was proposed in4 as a
way to incorporate the locations of sources
(generators) and sinks (loads) into a measure
of network vulnerability. Connectivity loss
is defined: C = 1 −
〈
nig/ng
〉
i
, where ng is
the number of generators in the network and
nig is the number of generators that can be
reached by traveling from node i across non-
failed links.
The third measure, which does not appear
in the existing network science literature, is
blackout sizes as calculated from a model of
cascading failure in a power system. While
a perfect model of cascading failure would
accurately represent the continuous dynam-
ics of rotating machines, the discrete dy-
namics associated with relays that disconnect
stressed components from the network, the
non-linear algebraic equations that govern
flows in the network, and the social dynam-
ics of operators working to mitigate the ef-
fects of system stress, all power system mod-
els simplify these dynamics to some extent.
Unlike simple topological metrics, our model
does capture the effects of Ohm’s and Kirch-
hoff’s laws, by using linear approximations of
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the non-linear power flow equations17. Simi-
lar models have been used to study cascading
failure in a number of recent papers14,18,19.
In our model, when a component fails,
the “DC power-flow” equations are used to
calculate changes in network flow patterns.
In the DC approximation the net power in-
jected into a node (generation minus load:
Pi = Pg,i−Pd,i) is equal to the total amount of
power flowing to neighboring nodes through
links (transmission lines or transformers):
Pi =
∑
j(θi − θj)/Xij, where θi is the voltage
phase angle at node i, and Xij is the series
reactance of the link(s) between nodes i and
j. Each link has a relay that removes it from
service if its current exceeds 50% of its rated
limit for 5 seconds or more. The trip-time
calculations are weighted such that the relays
will trip faster given greater overloads. While
it is true that over-current relays are not uni-
versally deployed in high-voltage power sys-
tems, they provide a good approximation of
other failure mechanisms that are common,
such as lines sagging into underlying vegeta-
tion (an important contributor to the August
14, 2003 North American blackout20). Af-
ter a component fails the model recalculates
the power flow and advances to the time at
which the next component will fail, or quits
if no further components are overloaded. If
a component failure separates the grid into
unconnected sub-grids, the following process
is used to re-balance supply and demand. If
the imbalance is small, such that generators
can adjust their output by not more than
10% and arrive at a new supply/demand bal-
ance, this balance is achieved through gen-
erator set-point adjustments. If this adjust-
ment is insufficient, the smallest generator in
the sub-grid is shut down until there is an ex-
cess of load. If there is excess load after these
generator adjustments, the simulator curtails
enough load to balance supply and demand.
This balancing process approximates the pro-
cess that automatic controls and operators
follow to balance supply and demand during
extreme events. The size of the blackout (S)
is reported at the end of the simulation as the
total amount of load curtailed.
III. ATTACK VECTORS
In order to measure power network vul-
nerability, we test the response of 41 elec-
tricity networks to a variety of exogenous
disturbance vectors (attacks or random fail-
ures). In each case we measure the relation-
ship between disturbance (attack or random
failure) size and disturbance cost using the
three vulnerability measures described above.
To compare our results with prior research
five disturbance vectors are simulated. These
are described as follows.
The first vector is random failure, in which
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nodes (buses) are selected for removal by ran-
dom selection, with an equal failure probabil-
ity for each node. This approach simulates
failure resulting from natural causes (e.g.,
storms) or an unintelligent attack. For each
network, we test its response to 20 unique
sets of random failures, with 10 nodes in each
set. These sets are initially selected from a
uniform distribution, and then applied incre-
mentally (one node, then two nodes, etc.).
The second vector is degree attack, in
which nodes are removed incrementally,
starting with the highest degree (connectiv-
ity) nodes. This strategy represents an intel-
ligent attack, in which the attacker chooses to
disable nodes with a large number of neigh-
boring nodes.
The third vector is a maximum-traffic at-
tack, in which nodes are removed incremen-
tally starting with those that transport the
highest amounts of power. We use the term
“traffic” to differentiate this measure from
“load,” which frequently describes the quan-
tity of power being consumed at a node.
Thus traffic (T ) is similar to the measures de-
scribed as load in4,9. The following measure
of node-loading is used to select maximum-
traffic nodes: Ti = |Pi|+∑j |(θi − θj)/Xij|.
The fourth vector is minimum-traffic at-
tack, which is the inverse of the max-traffic
attack. This vector is used for comparison
with the conclusions in9, which argues that
failures at low-traffic (load) nodes lead to
larger blackouts than failures at high-traffic
nodes.
The fifth vector is betweenness attack,
in which nodes are removed incrementally,
starting with those that have the highest be-
tweenness centrality (the number of shortest
paths that pass through a node2). This vec-
tor was used in4 to approximate an attack on
high traffic (load) nodes, and was reported to
result in disproportionately large failures.
IV. RESULTS
To compare the vulnerability measures we
report results from the simulation of random
failures and directed attacks for a common
test system (IEEE 300 bus test case) and 40
of 136 control areas from within the North
American Eastern Interconnect (EI). The EI
data come from a North American Electric
Reliability Corporation power-flow planning
case, to which the authors have been granted
access for the purpose of this research.21
The 40 control areas analyzed were selected
because of their proximate sizes (336-1473
nodes). Together they represent 29,261 of
49,907 nodes (buses) in the Eastern Inter-
connect data. We initialized the simulations
to provide an initial balance between supply
and demand by decreasing either load or gen-
eration, whichever was initially greater. In a
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few areas the base-case power flows exceeded
the rated flow limits. In these cases we in-
creased the line limits until all power flows
were 10% below the flow limits. Actual lo-
cations have been deleted from our data set,
such that these results are not linked to phys-
ical locations in the US electricity infrastruc-
ture.
The upper panels of Figs. 2 and 3 show
how path lengths (L) change as nodes are re-
moved from the test networks. In both the
IEEE 300 bus network and the EI areas path
lengths resulting from degree-based, max-
traffic, and betweenness attacks is greater
than the average L from random failures.
Min-traffic attacks do not substantially dif-
fer from random failures in this measure.
The middle panels of Figs. 2 and 3 illus-
trate the difference between the connectivity
losses (C) from directed attacks and C from
random failure. From this semi-topological
perspective, power grids are notably more
vulnerable to directed attacks than to ran-
dom failure, and are thus similar to scale-free
networks (see4 for a similar result).
The blackout size results (lower pan-
els of Figs. 2 and 3) also indicate that
power networks are notably more vulnerable
to directed (degree-based, max-traffic- and
betweenness-based) attack than they are to
random failure. Max-traffic attacks on 10
nodes produce blackouts with an average size
of 72%. Random failure of 10 nodes results
in an average blackout size of 20%, and min-
traffic attacks produced much smaller black-
outs (5% average). From these results it ap-
pears that the prediction in9 that attacks on
low-traffic nodes lead to large failures is not
accurate. Note that the measure of traffic
(load) used9 is different than ours, but it
would be incorrect to conclude that failures
at low power-flow nodes contribute substan-
tially to system vulnerability.
While trends in the path length, connec-
tivity loss and blackout size measures are sim-
ilar after averaging over many simulations,
the correlation between measures for individ-
ual simulations is poor. Because connectiv-
ity loss does not directly account for cas-
cading failure, it roughly predicts only the
minimum size of the resulting blackout (see
Fig. 4). Once triggered, the complex inter-
actions among network components during a
cascading event can result in a blackout of al-
most any size. Many disturbances with small
connectivity loss (<10%) produced very large
blackouts.
Another notable difference among the
model results is that one would draw different
conclusions about the most dangerous attack
vectors, depending on the vulnerability mea-
sure used. From path lengths, betweenness
attacks have the greatest impact. From con-
nectivity loss, degree-based attacks look most
6
dangerous. From the blackout model, max-
traffic attacks appear to contribute most to
vulnerability.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Together these results indicate that while
topological measures can provide some indi-
cation of general vulnerability trends, they
can also be misleading when used in isolation.
In some cases, overly-abstracted topological
models can result in erroneous conclusions,
which could lead to mis-allocation of risk-
mitigation resources. Vulnerability measures
that properly account for network behavior
as well as the arrangement of sources and
sinks produce substantially different results;
we argue that these results are more realistic
and more useful for infrastructure risk assess-
ment. If the results described here are similar
to what one would obtain from an ideal model
of cascading failure, the implication for elec-
tricity infrastructure protection is that the
defense of high-traffic, high-degree, and high-
betweenness substations from attack is likely
to be a cost-effective risk mitigation strategy.
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Figure 2. (color online). Simulated response of
the IEEE 300 bus network to directed attacks.
The top panel shows the change in characteris-
tic path lengths (L) as the number of failures
increases. The middle panel shows connectivity
loss (C) and the bottom panel shows the size
of the resulting blackout both as a function of
the number of components failed. The results
for random failures are averages over 20 trials.
The trajectories shown are differences between
the attack-vector results and the random failure
averages. Shading indicates ±1σ for the random
failures.
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Figure 3. (color online). Simulated response of
40 control areas in the Eastern Interconnect net-
work to directed attacks. The top panel shows
the average characteristic path lengths (L) as
the number of failures increases. The middle
panel shows connectivity loss (C) and the bot-
tom panel shows the size of the resulting black-
out both as a function of the number of compo-
nents failed. The results for random failures are
averages over 20 trials in each of the 40 areas.
The trajectories shown are differences between
the attack-vector results (averaged over the 40
areas) and the random failure averages. Shading
indicates ±1σ for the random failures.
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Figure 4. (color online). The correlation between
blackout sizes and connectivity loss (C) for 40
areas within the EI network. The correlation co-
efficients corresponding to each attack vector are
as follows: ρ = 0.210 (random failure), ρ = 0.621
(degree attack), ρ = 0.551 (max-traffic attack),
ρ = 0.288 (min-traffic attack), ρ = 0.138 (be-
tweenness attack), and ρ = 0.477 (all simula-
tions).
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